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Abstract
This paper advances the proposition that ‘Power Merely Equates to ‘Can’’. 
Many writers on power have been less than fully concerned what question 
concerning power they are, in effect, answering. In the critical criminological 
tradition for example, many writers speak merely of the negative outcomes of the 
application of power, adopting often unquestioningly the views of its nature
merely implicit in the writings of others. Attempts to disentangle the problems 
involved with identifying the nature of power have led to many disputes. It is the 
claim of this paper that most, if not all of these disputes can be resolved by 
adopting the above proposition. The adoption of the proposition advanced in this 
paper permits – in line with Deleuzoguattarian assemblage theory – social 
‘structures’ to be seen as mere (historically contingent) distributions
(concentrations) of capacities – what an entity can do. It then becomes an 
empirical task to identify and describe the assembling processes that permit or 
constrain these capacities.
Power: The Supposed Definitions Revisited.
We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other
words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with 
other affects, with the affects of another body ... either to exchange actions and 
passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body. (Deleuze 
and Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. 1987: 257)
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Introduction
I have suggested elsewhere (Crewe 2009 a & c) that I take it that human 
behaviour is the product of constrained will. This is, I think, a fundamental shift 
for criminologists. Conventionally the aetiology of crime has been said to lie 
between two conceptions of the human: the determined and the free. The 
determined human is more or less a slave to things beyond his control such as his 
biology, his psychology, or his social environment. The free individual is said to 
be at liberty to follow his libidinal desires. It has been clear for some time that 
these conceptions of the human in their purest form are inadequate accounts of 
our condition. The champion of determinism, like Schopenhauer (1902), for 
example, who says that we can never do anything other than just exactly what 
we do, denies the experience and the reality of human choice – there is always at 
least one alternative, to do, or not to do, or at least to resist or not to resist –
they further deny the possibility of the compatibility of freedom and determinism
permitted by the notion of freedom as an emergent property of determined 
systems (Crewe 2009a). Most soft accounts of determinism – possibly 
compatibilist accounts – have at their heart an assumption that certain aspects of 
the world are fixed and no amount of human freedom can change these things. 
On the other hand, the classicist champion of free will and rationality denies there 
is any human action for which he is not ultimately responsible, and that social 
formations arise and become stable because there exist certain controls that limit 
the exercise of humans’ freedoms. I have claimed elsewhere from Heidegger
(Crewe 2009a) that human nature is neither of these dichotomous things: we are 
simultaneously determined and capable of choices, and our resultant behaviour is 
emergent (in the strong sense) from that nexus of conditions. Where the 
classicist’s conception of freedom and choice is concerned, my claim is that these 
qualities do not manifest themselves in rationality but in phenomenal 
engagement with a past environment that we are not at liberty to change –
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determinism – and a similar engagement with a future that we are capable of 
making choices about. This is the nature of will, and this is the condition that 
Marx referred to when he said “[m]en make their own history, but they do not 
make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances of their own 
choosing, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from 
the past” (1963). The classicist would say were he to concede this point, that 
social controls limit the expression of our will. However, ‘social controls’ have 
always been defined very narrowly, and in some cases perniciously in order to 
demonize certain lifestyles or practices – often associated with parenting (chosen 
and determined conditions), economic disadvantage, and sexuality, among other 
things. Criminologists have defined social controls as equating to certain limited 
kinds of bonds, to self-control, to the conscience collective, to panoptical 
surveillance, or to stochastic calculations of the odds of being caught for example. 
If for this reason alone, the notion of ‘social control’ as a fundamental concept in 
social theory is inadequate to describe human social behaviour because it limits 
the conception of its sphere of action to those arenas defined as being of 
fundamental interest by the control theorist in line with his agenda. Thus, 
controls evident in parenting are seen to be responsible in their absence for 
delinquent behaviour only if controls in the arena of parenting are (arbitrarily) 
taken to be of primary importance by the writer. A further problem becomes 
apparent when we consider non-social controls upon people. An obvious example 
concerns the prisoner locked in a cell for hours on end. This is not a social control 
– in the way that control theorists usually intend them at any rate – and yet it is 
clearly a control that is of significant importance not only to the prisoner, but also
to the criminologist, the psychologist, and the sociologist: the will of the actor is 
constrained. When we read Paul Willis’ (1977) important book, Learning to 
Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs, we are made aware that 
certain attitudes, practices interactive features, social structures, etc. serves to 
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Crewe
2010, Vol. 2 (2) 22-68 Power
25
limit the “lads’” imagination concerning their processes of becoming. These things 
serve to constrain the formation of the “lads’” future view of themselves. Their 
will is constrained. Thus to speak of the constraint of will is not the same as to 
speak of social controls. The notion of freedom in most criminological and 
sociological theory is flawed, the notion of rationality is flawed and so is the 
notion of social control. However, whilst we have will it is not free. I should like to 
be lying on a beach in the Maldives with the warm zephyrs blowing through the 
palms (or something else more prosaic), but I cannot be there: some thing or 
things constrain me from being there – I have to write this, I haven’t enough 
money, an Icelandic volcano has closed all the airports. We have will and it is 
constrained in certain ways, and if human behaviour is the product of constrained 
will then it is appropriate that we as Criminologists or Sociologists should turn our 
attention to empirical and theoretical examination of the nature of that 
constraint: the nature of those capacities and the nature of the distribution of 
those capacities in society. However, there is another issue and that is, if our will 
is constrained, someone or something has power to constrain it – in whatever 
way – they can (it can) constrain it. Thus, if we are to understand the nature of 
constraint – the nature of the distribution of capacities in society – it is necessary 
that we first turn to the nature of power, and that is the task of this paper.   
Power
As an undergraduate student of social theory, I vividly remember being 
told that certain theoretical perspectives were deficient in that they lacked an 
adequate account of power. Indeed Barnes contends that “it is tempting to say 
that there is no account at all in the [social science] literature, accepted or not, of 
the basic nature of power in society” (1986:181). In the realm of criminological 
theory, this absence is particularly acute, albeit not in the way that my theory 
teachers meant. What my theory teachers meant was that perspectives like 
Symbolic Interactionism, rational choice or phenomenological models, were 
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Crewe
2010, Vol. 2 (2) 22-68 Power
26
lacking in an account of how powerful structures subjugate individual social 
actors, in other words, of the exercise of power, or of the normative critique of 
the distribution of power. They also meant that these perspectives were too 
consensual and failed to give an account of conflict. What I mean when I say that 
there is an absence of accounts of power in criminological theory, is that such 
accounts of the exercise of power, its distribution and role in conflict is all that 
there is in many cases where discussions of power are concerned. Criminological 
theories have largely failed to adopt an ontological view of what power is and 
where it comes from, but adopt views that are merely implicit in the writing of 
others. Views such as those of Scraton et al (1991:62) that “[l]ife in most British 
prisons is an unrelenting imposition of authority” are not uncommon and are 
located at one end of a continuum that represents a zero sum relationship 
between the ‘imposition of authority’ and individual freedom of some kind, as 
found in classical theory for example. In other words, power is represented in 
much criminological literature solely in terms of its manifestation, its assumed 
distribution, or the (assumed) normatively negative effect of its exercise, rather 
than any exploration of its ontology: the concept is used without ever stating 
what the concept is. Indeed, even in strain theories such as those of Agnew 
(1992) where social structures are supposed to have criminogenic effects, it is 
taken to be adequate to talk merely of the various vehicles of the power to affect 
these effects. Money brings power, being born to the right class brings power, 
making certain kinds of political decisions or ‘non-decisions’ brings power. 
Nowhere in the criminological literature is there an account of what power is. 
Moreover, even Marx speaks only of vehicles of power – the capitalist economy –
and thus those criminological accounts that appear to speak most forcefully about 
power – particularly of its negative qualities and its abuses – take for granted 
what ever it might be that power is. Frequently, even in the most critical of 
criminology, power is confused with its exercise. So, for example, in Phil 
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Scraton’s telling (1999) account of South Yorkshire Police’s deliberate and false 
defamation of the victims of the Hillsborough disaster1, their role in causing the 
atrocity, and subsequent criminally dishonest avoidance of any responsibility for 
the 96 people crushed to death, we are told merely what they have done; there is 
no account of the nature of the foundations of their capacity to behave so 
iniquitously (the nature of their power).
The concept “power” has proven to be amongst the most slippery concepts 
in the whole of the social sciences. Writers are conventionally concerned with the 
effects of the exercise of power by the powerful over the powerless and in some 
cases they are concerned to identify common attributes of phenomena that are to 
be observed when power is exercised justly, and when it is exercised unjustly. For 
example, in a recent paper entitled ‘Symbolic interactionism and the concept of 
power’ Dennis and Martin (2005) state that interactionism has, in the past been 
taken to be lacking in a concept of power. They go on to say that they wish to 
correct this view by showing that “interactionist research … shows a fundamental 
concern with power phenomena   … [and] with the social processes through which 
power is enacted … in real situations” (p: 191 my emphases). In other words, 
Denis and Martin are not, as their title suggests, interested in what the concept 
power is, but in the effects or outcomes of the exercise of power, which effects 
are phenomena emergent from the processes of territorialisation of assemblages 
(see Crewe 2009b & c).  
                                               
1 On 15th April 1989, 96 Liverpool Football Club fans were crushed to death at Hillsborough Stadium, 
the home ground of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club. The stampede that resulted in the fatalities 
was caused by police mismanagement of the crowds (Home Office 1989). The police set about 
blaming and defaming the Liverpool fans to the point of falsely accusing them of robbing and 
urinating on the corpses of fellow fans. The police did this in order to try and divert attention from 
their own culpability (see Scraton 1999).
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In the more philosophically grounded work of Nusbaum (2006 inter alia) 
and of Sen (1999 inter alia), for example, this tendency to speak of power in 
terms of its normative status is also manifest. Both writers are interested in 
international development, and whilst Nusbaum is keen to establish a set of core 
capabilities of humans, she does this in order to establish a normative critique of 
the unequal distribution of the possibility of, or constraint upon exercising those 
capacities. Similarly, Sen’s work on capabilities advocates deliberative democracy 
as a productive space in which societies may strive for social justice and equality. 
In both of these accounts, power – or capability – is examined in terms of its 
exercise or application and in terms of the normative judgements that may be 
made concerning the outcomes of that application. This is done in order to 
establish that this group or that group is negatively constrained by the processes 
of the exercise of power by another, and that this is a bad thing. Criminologists 
frequently are concerned to show the inequitable imposition of power by the 
“sedate engines of state” (as Auden puts it) over one group or another. However, 
should we accept the social ubiquity of power as expressed in Foucault (1970, 
1980, 1982, 1991, 1998, 2001, 2002 & passim) or in Weber (1964, 1968, 1978
inter alia), for example, a normative account will not do: any account that limits 
power to its moments of exercise denies its temporal and situational ubiquity, or 
suggests that power is exercised in some moments and not others, when, as will 
become clear, power is not a thing to be exercised in discrete quanta, but is an 
expression of continuous and universal (though unequal) distribution of 
capacities.  Should we wish to examine the role of power in structuring 
interactions and in structuring institutions, or, indeed the structuring attributes of 
interactions, then first, a non-normative account of the concept ‘power’ becomes 
necessary.
The production of such an account, however, appears to have reached a 
particular impasse. In 1982 Hindess published an important, much cited paper 
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entitled ‘Power, interests and the outcome of struggles’ (Hindess 1982). In this 
paper, Hindess made plain that he believed that it was impossible for power to be 
a disposition since its bases were situationally contingent. In 1987 Morriss
produced the book, ‘Power: A philosophical analysis’ (Morriss 2002) that argued 
that power must be taken as a disposition. Both works are soundly argued and 
thus there appear to be two equally convincing, but aporic conceptions of power. 
They appear to be aporic because, to be situated a phenomenon must be founded 
in its temporal and topical circumstances – the situation; to be a disposition it 
must transcend both the topical and the temporal. 
In the same year as Peter Morriss published ‘Power’, Giles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari (1987) published a work which, it is my belief, permits us to 
transcend this apparent aporia. ‘A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia’ offers the seeds of a new ontology of social structures and 
processes, which, through the work of Manuel DeLanda (2006) is achieving some 
recognition as ‘Assemblage Theory’ in parts of the academy more used to the 
foundations of analytical philosophy, rather than the continental philosophical 
style of Deleuze & Guattari. I have outlined elsewhere (Crewe 2009 b & c) a way 
in which ‘Assemblage Theory’ permits a new social ontology of power that 
transcends the limits of situational or dispositional accounts, and allows us to 
conceive of power as a disposition of situated processes of territorialisation of 
assemblages. 
The Contested Nature of ‘Power’ in the Social Sciences
If there is one single commonly accepted view, of the concept of power in 
the social sciences, it is taken to mean the bringing about of consequences. 
Attempts to be more rigorous have proven fraught with difficulties, and, we might 
ask, whether indeed, the bringing about of consequences is a necessary or 
sufficient aspect of power at all: power, after all, can be latent – the prime 
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minister does not cease to be powerful when he is doing nothing, he only ceases 
to be powerful when he is no longer attached to the government – the policeman 
does not cease to have the power of arrest when he sits down to a cup of tea, he 
does however, loose that power when he ceases to belong to the police force, or 
indeed goes home after work: these are historically contingent assemblages from 
which power (capacities) emerges, and which coalesce and dissolve –
territorialize and de-territorialize – continually.  Different disciplines within the 
social sciences recognise different bases for power such as wealth, knowledge, 
violence, or status for example2; they recognise different forms of power such as 
dominance, influence, charisma, or control; they speak of different vehicles of 
power such as discourse, money, or weapons; and they recognise different uses
of power such as political, economic, or community ends. Thus, different 
branches of the social sciences locate and describe power differently according to 
their own particular theoretical needs. Writers have questioned whether power is 
for example, a zero-sum concept (Mills 1956, Parsons 1960); a potential or a 
resource (Barry 1976, Wrong 1995); a property of systems or individuals, or a 
property of the relationship between systems or individuals (Arendt 1970, Lukes 
1974, Parsons 1963); whether it relies upon coercion (Cartwright 1959), or can 
be expressed as a product of negotiation (Beetham 1991, Giddens 1986).  
Dispute arises from the choice of unit or level of analysis: power as emergent 
from the bourgeois economy (Marx passim) is conceived of very differently from 
power emergent from The Situation (Blumer 1954). Thus, it is argued (Gray 
1983, Lukes 1974, Morriss 2002) that the concept of power is frequently 
theoretically contingent: it varies its nature according to what the theorist wishes 
to do with the concept.
Sociologists have frequently been concerned with a core dispute between 
two views represented by Weber (1968 [1922]) and Mills (1956) on the one 
                                               
2 It is of interest that some of these are both bases and vehicles.
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hand, and Parsons (1963) on the other. The former claim that power equates to 
domination of one group over another in the pursuit of disputed interests; the 
latter, Structural Functionalist view that power is a general property of societies 
that permits objectives to be achieved in the interest of collective goals. This 
latter, portrays power as a capacity of systems to achieve ends, whereas the 
former stresses the relationship where one group trumps another. Mills’ account 
was also the subject of critique from pluralists (Dahl 1957 & 1961, Polsby 1980 
[1963]) in that it represents the view that one group dominates a society, rather 
than the pluralist view that temporary alliances are formed by similarly interested 
persons creating a fluid, constantly restructuring pattern of power relations. 
Significantly, this view rejected any conception of power as resident in non-
decisions, that is, the view of Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Wolfinger (1971)
that the powerful can affect the powerless by deliberately not making decisions 
where they are concerned, or as related to un-operationalizable concepts such as 
‘interests’, or the ‘mobilisation of bias’ (Merelman 1968, Wolfinger 1971). 
Specifically, this requirement for observability in pluralist accounts was the focus 
for discontent among neo-elitists (inter alia Mills) and conflict theorists (inter alia
Poulanzas 1979), who maintained that public decision making frequently masked 
the true operation of power. Such stratified theories have dominated 
considerations of power within political sciences; however, Barry’s (1976) rational 
choice account, Foucault’s (1970, 1980 & 1982, 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1998) 
and Luhmann’s (1979) neo-functionalist accounts have brought such stratified 
views under increasing scrutiny, a retreat from the tendency to assume that 
power is always exercised from the top down, and a retreat from entirely 
macroscopic analyses. This retreat from wholly macroscopic analyses of power 
brings into focus the effect of power upon the individual and of the individual’s 
role in bringing about consequences. However, power is ontologically not 
constrained by notions of intention or outcome (as I shall show later), as it is not 
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normatively contingent, as White (1972) attempts to suggest. To limit talk of 
power to its outcomes restricts the notion of power to its exercise, furthermore, it 
is nonsense to suggest that all outcomes of the exercise of power are normatively 
negative: it requires the exercise of significant power to mobilise a UN 
peacekeeping force to enable the distribution of aid in the third world for 
example. To speak only of intentional acts denies an account of the consequential 
effects of recursive or “practically conscious” behaviour. What this broad spread 
of conceptualizations of power brings to light is that it should be recognized that 
there are several different questions that one can ask about power: What is 
power – or what does it amount to? How is power distributed: that is two 
questions; one, what are the mechanisms (vehicles) of its distribution and two, 
where is it concentrated? What are the effects of its distribution? The evidence in 
the extant literature is that the vast majority of writers on power seem to fail to 
recognize this: they fail to take care what question concerning power they are in 
effect answering. 
All of the above modes of conceiving of power fail to tell us what power is; 
they tell us what power can do, they tell how power can be used, how it can be 
distributed, who might hold it and whether any of these things is normatively 
positive or negative. In terms of asking (or answering), what power is it is rather 
like asking: What is marmalade? And getting the answer, marmalade is spread on 
toast. The reason why this is so is because writers are speaking of the description 
of some of the effects, or patterns, or mechanisms, of the distribution of power 
rather than speaking about its ontology. This is not to say that these accounts of 
power are all necessarily wrong, it is just that writers have been careless in 
identifying what question concerning power they are, in effect, answering. 
The Concept ‘Power’
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It must be recognized that power is a concept and it is important to know 
what the concept ‘concept’ means before one can grapple with the concept 
‘power’. I was once severely berated by a senior academic at a presentation 
during the gestation of this paper, for suggesting that power was a concept: “tell 
that to the powerless and disenfranchised” he said, or something a little less 
temperate. For this academic, power was some kind of measurable, quantifiable, 
tangible stuff ‘out there’: some res extensa, some extended, physical thing that 
was being illicitly appropriated by the powerful and denied to the powerless, and 
presumably carried around in boxes or bags, and distributed or hoarded like fruit 
or meat in wartime. Such beliefs are harboured by people who would be quite 
prepared to ask who hoards foodstuffs and whether they did it because they were 
powerful, but not prepared to consider what it means to say that any one was 
powerful, or if it would be meaningful or what it might mean to say that anyone 
who hoarded food was powerless3. But of course power is a concept; it is an idea 
that brackets a range of other conceptual relations in such a way that it is 
shorthand for whatever relations it conveys – it is an intensive ordinate, not an 
extensive co-ordinate, it has thisness or haecceity, not aboutness – and it is this 
‘content’ of the concept ‘power’ that we need to disentangle. What does it mean 
to say that someone is powerful, or that someone has power; we need to ask the 
question: To what does the concept power amount? And our expression must be 
universal and parsimonious.
                                               
3 It is commonplace for criminologists of a critical bent to suggest that people sometimes commit 
crimes because they are powerless. This raises the question of what it would mean to say that anyone 
is powerless to do whatever it is they do. This must not be taken to mean that I side with those who 
wish to eradicate the role of the inequitable distribution of capacities in accounts of the generation of 
virtually all crimes. It is simply to say that it is nonsense to suggest that one may be powerless to do 
what one does, even if one’s actions are determined by things outside ones control.
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Why we need an ontology of the concept ‘power’
Concepts are made by thinking people – theoreticians, philosophers and so 
on – in order to produce theories that solve sense-making problems in the real 
world. (The concept is formed in the same crucible as the problem that the theory 
– that is made from the concept – is made to solve.4) Power is a concept in this 
way. We need to attempt to agree that the concept that any one thinker 
generates is useful to more than just him, or his theory won’t be of any use to 
anyone but him. Hence, the concept that is made must be one that can be agreed 
upon because it more or less conforms to what others would agree constitutes a 
reasonably realistic and useful expression of the concept. So, my concept power 
is not only expressed in a way that helps make theories concerning the 
structuring of capacities in society coherent, but also in a way that I hope others 
will recognize as being coherent with the way they see the world and the place of 
the concept within it. If this is so, then readers are more likely to agree that it 
represents a good sense-making tool. 
Examining the concept power.
It is appropriate at this stage that I make some comments about my 
intentions how to proceed with my discussion of power. It follows from what I 
have said immediately above concerning the nature of the manufacture of 
concepts that I take it that a concept should enable the production of coherent, 
effective theory and that it should be agreed upon in usage such that it clarifies 
and eradicates inconsistencies and unnecessary disputes: A usefully, 
parsimoniously expressed concept should stop us from talking at cross purposes. 
I intend to proceed by examining some of those disputes concerning power, and I 
shall examine them in the light of my claim that power merely equates to can. 
This may seem like a bold and even unjustified step since I have provided no 
                                               
4 See Deleuze and Guattari What is Philosophy. 1994
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grounds for this claim, however, I cannot illustrate the sense making capacities of 
my claim without stating it, and so I do this. Power merely equates to can.
My claim will, in effect, be tried alongside the other disputed claims 
concerning power. Whilst there is not room in this place for an exhaustive 
examination of the concept, it is my intention that the examination should be 
illustrative at least of the efficacy of my expression of the nature of power. In 
addition to the disputes in the sociological and political science literature I shall 
explore common usage of the concept. It is not that I take it that common sense 
use is necessarily accurate, true, or efficacious, but a concept generated for 
theory making that does not cohere with real world usage of the term is likely not 
to have much use in the real world.
Power Merely Equates to Can. 
Can, capacity, and ability
Is ‘can’ “iffy”?
The proposition that I wish to advance is that power merely equates to 
can, or is merely the capacity to do something. Not only do I contend that this is 
so, but, as I have argued in these pages and elsewhere (Crewe 2009 a & b), we 
can have a pragmatic, sense-making picture of societies that corresponds to an 
account of the capacities of their elements rather than of the properties, allied to 
functions, of their constituent parts. To speak of power in this view is merely to 
speak of the distribution of capacities in society. Hence conceiving of power in 
this way has the fortuitous property that it contributes to an homogenous, 
parsimonious, and coherent theory of the structuring processes of societies, of 
which law, transgression, and crime are a part. The claim then is that power 
equates to can. It is appropriate that we examine what this means.
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A particularly important dispute concerning the verb ‘can’ was highlighted 
by the great philosopher J. L. Austin when he wrote that ‘can’ is “constitutionally 
iffy” (1956:205). What Austin meant was not that ‘can’ is constitutionally ‘dodgy’, 
but that the verb ‘can’ always needs to be associated with the word ‘if’. There are 
two ways in which this is so, claims Austin. The first is that whenever we use the 
word can or could, we must either supply or imply an ‘if’ clause to complete the 
sentence. The second is that if we don’t need to use an ‘if’ to complete a sentence 
we need to use an ‘if’ to analyse the nature of the ‘can’ that is being talked about. 
These two views, says Austin, are incompatible with one another. Morriss (2002) 
begs to differ. Both views, for him, are correct. 
‘[I]fs’ are related to ‘cans’ in many different ways, two of which are 
captured by Austin’s distinction: some ‘ifs’ complete ‘can’-sentences; 
others are part of the analysis; and it is to overlook the complexity of the 
conditional aspects of ability to force all ‘ifs’ into the one category or the 
other. (2002: 60-61)
It seems to me, however that both writers are wrong, they do not appear 
to be using the same word ‘can’ as I am. Among the meanings of ‘can’ possibly 
associated with power, none requires an ‘if’. The first of these meanings is to be 
able – to have the ability. If we append an ‘if’ to a claim concerning this meaning 
of can it would look like this: ‘I can drive my car if I put some petrol in it’. We can 
legitimately rephrase this by saying ‘I could … if I put some petrol in it’. What this 
means is this: ‘I can’t – I am powerless to – drive my car because I haven’t put 
any petrol in it.’ Adding ‘if’ changes ‘can’ to ‘can’t’. The second aspect of this 
meaning is to ‘know how’, that is, I ‘know how’ to drive my car. This can also be 
expressed as the ability, or skill, to do something. This capacity is relatively 
enduring and constitutes a dispositional claim – something to which we will turn 
shortly. However, this claim, ‘I can drive my car’ expressed as ‘I know how to 
drive my car’ most certainly does not require an ‘if’. Furthermore if we try to 
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append some kind of ‘if’ the claim becomes ‘I know how to drive my car if, and 
only if, such and such is true’ (I can remember how, let’s say). This means ‘I 
cannot drive my car because I have forgotten how’ (for example). ‘If’ turns ‘can’ 
into ‘cannot’ (until such and such is true, or we might say until the ‘ifs’ are 
satisfied). Morriss asks us to consider the capacity of sugar to dissolve in water. 
This, he says is an example of a disposition that has conditions – ‘ifs’ – attached 
to it: sugar does not dissolve in water in all circumstances he claims. Sugar will 
not dissolve in water when the water is already saturated with sugar he tells us, 
nor will it dissolve if it has been heated sufficiently to caramelise it into bonfire 
toffee. These are ‘ifs’ says Morriss, that attach to the ‘can’ of ‘sugar can dissolve 
in water’. That is Sugar can dissolve in water if the water is not already 
saturated, or sugar can dissolve in water if it has not been caramelised. But 
clearly this is wrong. What Morriss is actually saying is ‘sugar will not dissolve in
saturated sugar solution’ or that ‘bonfire toffee will not dissolve in water’, not 
‘sugar will dissolve in water if …’ Morriss goes on to say that there are “ordinary” 
ifs such as “if that is sugar, the water can dissolve it”. However in the two cases 
immediately above, the ‘if’ of this claim is not satisfied, it is not sugar, or it is not 
water, it is toffee, or it is a saturated sugar solution. Furthermore, if this was to 
be a meaningful way of talking about power, it would be necessary to indicate 
every possible world in which something related to sugar did not dissolve in 
something related to water – Morriss’ possible ‘caramelized sugar won’t dissolve 
in water if it is frozen’ or ‘water has the capacity to dissolve sugar if it is not 
frozen and the sugar is not caramelized’, or ‘sugar has the capacity to dissolve in 
water if it is not vaporized’, becomes, more reasonably ‘toffee won’t dissolve in 
ice’ or ‘sugar won’t dissolve in steam’. 
Abilities, however, are “iffy”.
I can, but I am not doing.
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When we use the word ‘can’ in those circumstances associated with the 
power to do something or other, we frequently associate it with the word ‘ability’. 
If you can do something, you are ‘able’ to do something. This is always true. 
However, it is not always true that if you are able to do something, you can do it. 
This is because there are two kinds of use of the word able. This is the distinction 
between capacities and abilities. Capacities are ‘cans’ that you can do, and they 
may be manifest or latent, but you can do them. Abilities can be things that you 
can’t do, but could do in other circumstances. We could say, ‘I have the ability to 
do this and I could do it if ...’.
Peter Morriss distinguishes between epistemic abilities, things that you 
know how to do, and non-epistemic abilities, things that you just can and do do 
without the need for specific knowledge. I take Morriss to be talking about what 
Giddens (1986) has called practical consciousness knowledge – our fundamental
set of abilities that we use in our basic capacity to know how to ‘go on’ in day-to-
day life. Morriss illustrates this with the following:
We [are able to] say both ‘He is so incompetent that he’s unable to do it’ 
and ‘He’s able to do it all right, but too incompetent to manage it’. These 
statements do not contradict each other; they simply use epistemic and 
non-epistemic senses of ability. (2002:52)
He goes on to say that he is unable to do The Times crossword, but that it 
is not because he lacks the strength to fill in the letters that he cannot do it, but 
that he lacks the required knowledge or skill. This, it seems to me, is to introduce 
a fundamental confusion. Clearly, Morriss, like me, cannot do The Times
crossword, and his incompetent is incapable of doing whatever it is Morriss has in 
mind him doing. That is both are powerless to do the things in question. The 
question Morriss is trying to introduce lies not in their power or powerlessness 
since that is obvious, they are powerless in these respects, but in the nature of 
the constraint that is placed upon them. However, it is not necessary to 
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understand the nature of any particular constraint in order to comprehend the 
nature of power, or whether or not someone is powerful in any particular regard. 
The nature of constraints is much more of an empirical sociological problem 
rather than a philosophical one.
Morriss goes on to ask whether, when he plays loud music in his flat late 
at night, that keeps his neighbours awake, he can be considered powerful to keep 
them awake if it is merely an unforeseen consequence that he keeps them 
awake. “Is, in this case, what I am doing keeping them awake, or is this merely a 
consequence of what I am doing? Am I doing two things at once and, if so am I 
performing two different actions or one action with two descriptions?” Surely, this 
is an unnecessary distinction since, he does keep his neighbours awake – he can
do it – and it makes no sense whatsoever to suggest that he (or anyone else for 
that matter) is powerless to do something that they do do. He can keep his 
neighbours awake: he has the power – the capacity – to keep his neighbours 
awake.
The key point here is that if you can do something you have the capacity –
the power – to do it, whether that capacity rests on ‘practical’ – practical 
consciousness knowledge – or cognitive knowledge or abilities. However, when 
you have the cognitive ability or the skill to do something, it does not necessarily 
mean that you can do that thing, and that is because someone or something may 
have the power to constrain your actions in that regard. This is where the 
distinction between capacities and abilities becomes important; that is, in the 
analysis of the mechanisms of the distribution of power. We might bring to mind, 
for example, a clever junior hot-rod engineer whose abilities far outstrip those of 
his boss. However, because the young engineer is in the employ of his boss the 
poorer decisions of his boss concerning building the car prevail. The young 
engineer has the ability to build a fine hot-rod but he does not have the capacity. 
The capacities of his employer to fire him constrain his abilities such that he can’t 
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– he is powerless to, he does not have power to – build the good car because his 
employer can (ultimately) fire him if he doesn’t do as he’s told. Some would 
undoubtedly say that his boss has ‘power over’ him in this regard, but, as we 
shall see later, the locution ‘power over’ is at best unnecessary, and at worst a 
damaging form of power talk. One’s abilities can be constrained. Ones capacities 
cannot. Since, if you have the capacity to do something you can do it, and if you 
can do something you cannot be considered powerless in that regard. 
Power and the bringing about of consequences: Dispositionals and 
the exercise fallacy.
As I mentioned above, power has been taken by many to equate to the 
“bringing about of consequences” (Lukes 1979:634; Lukes 1986). Or in Dahl’s 
formulation “for the assertion ‘C has the power over R’, one can substitute the 
assertion ‘C’s behaviour causes R’s behaviour’” (Dahl 1968: 410). We might 
rephrase Dahl’s formulation further: “for the assertion ‘C has the power over R’, 
one can substitute the assertion” ‘C’s behaviour is causing R’s behaviour’ or ‘C’s 
Behaviour is bringing about R’s behaviour.  It is Dahl’s use of the word “causes” 
that permits us to substitute ‘is causing’. Had he written, “may cause”, the 
meaning would have been different; indeed it would have meant “could cause in 
certain circumstances”. If this were the nature of Dahl’s claim, then he would 
have to specify those specific circumstances for every possible instance of C’s 
power over R. This notwithstanding, it is far from clear that this claim that power 
equates to the bringing about of consequences is an adequate one. The problem 
with this conception of power is that it denies the existence of latent power. We 
may bring to mind a policeman, in whom we assume is vested the power of 
arrest. Lukes’ and Dahl’s claim that power equates to the bringing about of 
consequences makes it plain that the policeman’s power equates only to his 
actually arresting someone. Of course, the common use of the word ‘vested’ in 
this circumstance, to mean ‘having been given the possession of’ suggests that 
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either the use of the word ‘vested’, or that Lukes’ and Dahl’s conception of power 
is wrong. However, there are far more serious problems that mean that Lukes’ 
and Dahl’s view is not compatible with the real world, and this is so because when 
we say that power equates to its exercise, the period of having that power and 
the period of its exercise must be absolutely identical. In this view, when the 
policeman is not arresting someone he is not bringing about that consequence 
and thus, according to this claim, when he is not actually arresting someone, he 
does not have power to do so. In this circumstance we would then have to ask 
where the power ‘came from’ when he was arresting someone, if he did not 
possess it latently – as a disposition. At what point, we might ask, did the power 
to arrest ‘enter into him’ (as it were) such that he could begin his arrest. Also we 
would have to ask when it was that the arrest actually began; was it when the 
policemen said “‘ello, ‘ello, ‘ello, what’s goin’ on ‘ere then?” Or was it when he 
snapped the handcuffs on? If, as Lukes, and Dahl, and others suggest, his power 
to arrest equates to his actually arresting, that ‘power’ cannot become available 
to him until he starts his arrest, but if this is so, until he has started his arrest he 
has no power to effect that arrest and thus would be powerless to start the 
arrest. Either that, or there would have to be a different power – the power to 
start an arrest. If this was the case then the policeman would only have the 
power to start the arrest when actually starting the arrest and not before and 
thus, he would need a new power – the power to start starting the arrest. Oh 
dear! Clearly this will not do. The problem arises because this conception of 
power denies the latent qualities or the dispositional nature of power. In the view 
of Dahl and Lukes and others, a person never can have power to do anything
unless he is actually doing it and that simply cannot be true of the real world.
This problem is closely related to the dispute between writers who take 
power to be a disposition and those like Hindess (1982) who see power as being 
entirely situated. For Hindess, the bases of power and the vehicles of power in 
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each situation are so varied that it is nonsense to suggest that there is any 
enduring quality to power, or that power might be latent or possessed. The 
solution to this problem is the same as the solution to the dispute between those 
who take power to be a disposition and those who see power as the bringing 
about of consequences. It is commonplace in language to speak of events that we 
observe or have observed taking place, we can say for example that people are 
leaving the campus because it is 5 o’clock or the leaves on the trees are turning 
red or orange. But we can also speak of the potential for things to happen. We 
can say, for example, during the late summer, the leaves will be turning red or 
orange in a few weeks time. So to do is not to describe an event but to refer to a 
disposition. Thus, we may refer to temporally situated – historically contingent –
events and we may refer to potentialities that are relatively temporally un-
situated, they are relatively enduring capacities. Where the concept of power is 
concerned, some writers have been less than fully concerned to distinguish 
between the two. Kenny, cited at length in Morriss 2002 has this to say:
Consider the capacity of whisky to intoxicate. The possession of this 
capacity is clearly distinct from its exercise: the whisky possesses the 
capacity while it is standing harmlessly in the bottle, but it only begins to 
exercise it after being imbibed. The vehicle of this capacity to intoxicate 
is the alcohol that the whisky contains: it is the ingredient in virtue of 
which the whisky has the power to intoxicate. The vehicle of a power 
need not be a substantial ingredient like alcohol which can be physically 
separated from the possessor of the power…. The connection between 
the power and its vehicle may be a necessary or a contingent one. It is a 
contingent matter, discovered by experiment, that alcohol is the vehicle 
of intoxication; but it is a conceptual truth that a bolt has the power to 
screw into a nut.
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Throughout the history of philosophy there has been a tendency 
for philosophers – especially scientifically-minded philosophers – to 
reduce potentialities to actualities. But there have been two different 
forms of reductionism, often combined and often confused, depending on 
whether the attempt was to reduce a power to its exercise or to its 
vehicle. Hume when he said that the distinction between a power and its 
exercise was wholly frivolous wanted to reduce powers to their exercises. 
Descartes when he attempted to identify all the powers of bodies within 
their geometrical properties, wanted to reduce powers to their vehicles 
(Kenny 1975:10)
To attempt these two reductions is to commit respectively the exercise 
and the vehicle fallacies. The first involves the suggestion that talking of having 
power is merely a metaphysically illegitimate way of saying that you are 
exercising that power (Morriss 2002). We may call to mind Polsby, when he 
states that we have no reason to presuppose that a person or an object 
possesses a particular attribute unless we have firsthand experience of an event 
that demonstrates the exercise of that attribute. To illustrate the point, Morriss 
paraphrases Polsby. Where Polsby speaks of powerful actors, Morriss substitutes 
sugar, thus -
How can one tell after all, whether or not a sugar lump is soluble unless 
some sequence of events competently observed, attests to its solubility? 
If these events take place, then the solubility of the sugar lump is not 
“potential” but actual [i.e., presumably, the sugar dissolves]. If these 
events do not occur, then what grounds have we to suppose that the 
sugar is soluble? (Morriss 2002:16)
When sugar is substituted for Polsby’s powerful actors in this way, so to 
speak becomes plainly fallacious. Of course we have many grounds to suggest 
that the sugar is soluble, not least the common knowledge that sugar is soluble, 
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accompanied by knowledge of other attributes of sugar molecules (from 
chemistry) that attest to the permanent, abiding disposition of sugar to dissolve 
in water. Dispositions can remain unmanifest. The glass in our windows we hope 
will remain intact despite the fact that we know it to be fragile – I know, and trust 
the fact, that Professor Lippens can speak Flemish without ever having heard him 
speak the language: to say that he has the capacity to speak Flemish is not the 
same as saying he is speaking Flemish. Some, like Dahl (1984) have argued that 
we cannot know where power lies if we cannot see it exercised. However, there is 
a significant difference between admitting that we can only experience or observe 
power through its exercise and arguing that power is in and of itself no more than 
its exercise. The police officer continues to have the power of arrest even when 
he is not exercising that power. Thus, says Morriss – “power [is] a dispositional 
concept [it] is neither a thing (a resource or vehicle) nor an event (an exercise of 
power): it is a capacity.” (2002:19). It represents a relative disposition belonging 
to social relationships. 
If we return again to our policeman. Clearly, when he is sitting down to 
have his cup of tea he can effect an arrest should a man attempt to rob the till of 
the café in which he is sat, even though he is not, at this time doing it. It makes 
no sense whatsoever to say that he is powerless to do something that he can do, 
hence, if he can do it he has power to do it5 – if he can arrest the man (to all 
intents and purposes) whilst sitting down having a cup of tea he has the power to 
do so. It is also the case that should the police officer have been handcuffed to 
the chair by the gang robbing the café, he cannot effect an arrest. It makes no 
sense whatsoever to suggest that he has the power to do something he cannot 
do, since if he cannot do something, then he is powerless to do it (he is powerless 
                                               
5 This is true unless it can be shown that the use of the word powerlessness does not constitute the 
opposite of powerfulness, or having power with respect to, or being powerful.
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with respect to that thing) and it makes no sense whatsoever to suggest that 
someone has the power to do something that they are powerless to do. The 
perspicacious might aver that the policeman can’t arrest the man if the man is 
not committing the robbery, that is, he can’t arrest the man until he starts his 
robbery and then the policeman will arrest him. This looks a bit like not having 
the power until the burglary takes place, or only having the power when 
exercising it. This would mean that his power was situated, not dispositional. 
What this shows us is that whilst power is dispositional, such dispositions are 
variably durable: our capacities are not fixed but always in a state of flux. We can 
do things until we can’t. It is never legitimate to say that someone has power 
with respect to any thing he cannot do, for whatever reason, and it is never 
legitimate to say that someone is powerless to do something that they can do –
for whatever reason. Thus, when the policemen can effect an arrest he has power 
in that regard, when he cannot, then he is powerless to effect an arrest. This 
does not mean that these capacities may not be dispositional, but if someone 
cannot do something, they cannot legitimately be described as being powerful in 
that regard – capacities are dispositional and situated, they are relatively durable, 
historically contingent properties emergent from the territorializing processes of 
assemblages6. Morriss and Hindess were both right. So, it is true that my brother 
can ride a motorcycle, he has the power to ride that motorcycle. He does not 
have the power to ride his motorcycle if he has sold it. He doesn’t have power to 
ride the motorcycle even if he possesses one but his wife won’t let him ride it 
because it is icy, even though he doesn’t lose the skill or the ability to ride it: he 
still is powerless with regard to riding the motorcycle. Power is a disposition, but 
it is a disposition that is always situated, each situation brings the capacities of 
others with which that capacity may be in conflict, and in each new situation new 
                                               
6 See in general Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and Wise (2005), for an application of these ideas in a 
social context, De Landa (2006), and for an application of these ideas in criminology Crewe (2009 b & 
c)
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capacities emerge and some ‘cans’ (capacities) that may have been relatively 
durable become ‘can’ts’. We may be interested in the effects of power – who has 
criminalized whom, who produces economic circumstances that weaken the 
informal social functions of families and encourage violent crime (Currie 1997), 
who successfully lobbies government to ratchet up surveillance, securitization,
imprisonment. But we are also interested in who might have the power to do 
these things and that power, existent and unexercised is latent, dispositional, and 
un-situated. Sometimes ‘can’ means exactly ‘could’ if the ‘ifs’ of ‘could’ are 
satisfied (‘could do if … ’), but only if the ‘ifs’ are satisfied. But ‘could do’ does not 
equate in any way to ‘is doing’ – in fact they are mutually exclusive –  therefore 
‘is doing’ cannot equate to ‘can’, but is merely a possible subset (or, indeed, 
evidence) of can.
Power and influence.
In addition to the conflation or identification of power with its exercise, 
power is also commonly identified with other terms. In Machiavelli (2007), for 
example imperio, forza, potente, and autorità are used interchangeably without 
clarification or definition; in Foucault (passim), puissance and pouvoir. A further 
wrongful identification is commonplace, and that is the identification of power 
with influence. Above, we examined the claim that power equates to the effecting
of consequences. The conflation of power with influence concerns the claim that 
power equates to affecting things or people. It is worthwhile settling the 
difference between these two frequently confused words. They are confusing 
because the noun that relates to affect is effect: we can affect someone such that 
it causes an effect. In its most common meaning the verb affect means to have 
an impact on or to make a difference to or to influence. To effect something is to 
bring it about. Many writers have insisted that power and influence are 
indistinguishable. Napel and Widgrén (2004) use the terms interchangeably when 
they argue that power is less interesting a concept than influence. This may well 
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be so for Napel and Widgrén, but it does not mean that the concepts can be 
substituted for one another, as they appear to do. Dahl has this to say: “A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do” (1957: 80). He also says “A influences B to the extent that he gets 
B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1963: 40). This, of 
course would mean that power and influence are identical because →X = Z & Y=
Z  X =Y. Indeed in his 1957 he argues that any perceived difference between 
the two words is merely a quirk of the English language. The question must be 
asked: Is this claimed identity true?
If we look at the linguistic question first, influence is both a verb and a 
noun whilst power is primarily a noun. A verb ‘to power’, meaning to provide
power exists for some material objects like some machines, but it doesn’t really 
make much sense socially. However, we cannot say ‘to influence’, meaning to 
provide influence. It is not uncommon for nouns (like power) to be transformed 
into verbs – the noun ‘stain’ becomes the verb ‘to stain’, the noun ‘regiment’ 
becomes ‘to regiment’ – whilst we can do this with ‘influence’ (the noun 
‘influence’ becomes the verb, ‘to influence’) we cannot do it to ‘power’. The two 
are not the same grammatically and it would be an odd word if the two concepts 
were identical but one had a grammatical form that the other lacked. The reason 
that they are grammatically different would be explained if power did not refer to 
something that could be expressed as a verb, and indeed, this is true. There is no 
verb ‘to can’ or ‘to capacity’. We can see how this grammatical difference shows 
the non-identity of these concepts when we try to substitute one for another in 
various sentences. Take for example the possible “Tony Blair influenced George 
Bush to go to war”. We cannot substitute power for influence in this sentence 
legitimately and say “Tony Blair powered George Bush to go to war”. Even if we 
took poetic licence with the grammatical form it would not mean the same as 
“Tony Blair influenced …”. “Tony Blair powered…” if used legitimately could only 
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mean “Tony Blair provided the power for George Bush” and this clearly is not the 
same as saying “Tony Blair provided the influence …”
Similar problems arise again in Dahl: 
When one says the president has more power to influence foreign policy 
than I have, then I think that one means that the president can cause 
behaviour in the State Department or Congress or in Germany or 
elsewhere that I cannot cause. (Dahl 1965: 93). 
This may be true, however we can rephrase what Dahl says thus: “When one 
says the president can influence foreign policy more than I can …” This is a 
legitimate substitution, however, substituting the claimed identical power for 
influence thus: “When one says the president has more influence to influence 
foreign policy than I have …” or “When one says the president has more power to 
power foreign policy than I have …” results in nonsense.
Having looked at some of the linguistic problems associated with the 
misidentification of power with influence, we may now turn to some other 
problems that an assumed identity might pose. An immediate problem comes to 
mind where certain areas of criminological study are concerned. It is contended 
by writers such as Ron Clarke, or Gotfredson and Hirschi among others that the 
absence of certain controls leads to the commission of crime. Where the 
misidentification of power with influence is concerned this would mean that the 
victim of a burglary at a house without a burglar alarm (absent control) had 
power over the burglar. We do not feel that this is right. This is probably because 
we feel that the powerful must be powerful with respect to something he intends
to do, and frequently that that intended thing is normatively negative. However, 
we will see shortly, that intention is not axiomatically associated with acts of 
power. The real reason that this is problematic is that power merely equates to 
can. What we must do is ask in what regard is the victim powerful – what is it 
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they can, or in this case, have done? What they can do (have done) is influence 
the burglar, they have power to influence the burglar (through their choice to 
leave the window unlocked or not to fit a burglar alarm). If power and influence 
were the same thing there would be no necessity to use the same idea twice in 
the sentence as we saw above “the victim has influence to influence the burglar” 
or “power to power the burglar”. However, if power equates to can the two 
words, power and can, should be interchangeable: “the victim can influence the 
burglar”, “the victim has the capacity to influence the burglar” or “the victim has 
the power to influence the burglar”. These three propositions have meaning for 
criminologists in a way that suggestions that the victim is powerless do not. 
Wormuth (1967) suggests that it is problematic to consider that a person who 
fails adequately to hide his wallet exercises power over the wallet thief. He most 
certainly does influence the wallet thief, and therefore it is illegitimate to suggest 
that he is powerless to influence him. Young (1978) suggests that it is 
problematic to consider that a person who crashes their car and thus gives the 
insurance company a bill has exercised power over the insurance company. He 
most certainly does influence the insurance company’s behaviour and therefore it 
is illegitimate to suggest that he is powerless to influence them. Benn (1967) 
suggests that it is problematic to assume that the bankrupt financier whose 
dealings ruin the investments of thousands exercises power over them. The 
financier most certainly does influence the investors and it is therefore illegitimate 
to suggest that he is powerless to influence them. Each of these writers use their 
examples to attempt to argue that influencing people is not identical to what we 
mean by power. They do this by suggesting that the thief, the driver, and the 
financier are not powerful with respect to these cases, but this is clearly not so. 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that they are right to suggest that power and 
influence are not the same thing. Power equates to can. I can influence people, 
and I can influence things, I have power in that regard: it is nonsense to suggest 
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that I am powerless to influence those things I actually do influence. However, I 
also have power to effect things, and unless to effect and to affect are identical 
then power and affecting cannot be identical, since if power and affecting were 
identical, it is a logical necessity that the identity must mean that power is no 
more and no less than affecting and thus, unless effecting were identical with 
affecting, it could have no part in power as identical to affecting. Affecting and 
effecting are (different) things you can do, like walking or painting or thinking or 
believing. I can walk somewhere, I can paint something I can think something or 
I can believe something. I cannot ‘can’ something: I cannot power something. 
Power is can – capacity: effecting, affecting, walking, painting, thinking, 
believing, are things that I can do that I have the capacity to do. They are not the 
capacity itself: that is what power is.
A further problem with power and influence is that I clearly can have the 
capacity to affect something without doing it – this is in the nature of latency or 
disposition that we discussed above, and if I can have power to influence whilst 
not actually influencing (not effecting the affecting), it is impossible for power and 
influencing to be the same thing. I have the capacity to influence the practices of 
my colleagues in the criminology team at my university, but I am not currently 
doing so because I am at home in my study writing this. Thus, my actual 
influencing and my capacity to influence are two separate things. It is impossible 
for power and influence to be identical to one another. 
‘Power over’ and ‘power to’.
One of the major reasons that the above error of misidentifying power 
with influence has had such a hold in the power literature is because it is strongly 
associated with the notion of power as ‘power over’. When we re-read each of the 
statements concerning the claimed influence over burglars, wallet thieves, 
insurance companies etc, it becomes apparent that the phrase, ‘power over’ is 
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used every time. That is, power is talked about as though to be power it must 
constitute power over someone or something. One aspect of having power over 
someone that is frequently cited as a requisite is that it must involve getting 
someone to do something that they do not want to do. What this means is that, if 
this claim is true, if a person does something that you want them to do but they 
do it wilfully and of their own volition, you do not have power to get them to do 
what it is they do – you are powerless to do this. But this is a mistake in that it is 
not necessarily so. Here we can legitimately use the word ‘could’ to examine this 
proposition. We might legitimately say (if it were true) that the person X could
have power to get Y to do that something p in the circumstance that he (Y) 
doesn’t want to do p, and we can still say this even in the circumstance that Y
does want to do p. This is because ‘power’ refers merely to the capacity to do 
something (and such a capacity may be a relatively durable disposition), in this 
case to get Y to do that something p in the circumstance that he (Y) doesn’t want 
to do p. Such a capacity could still exist in the circumstance that Y does want to 
do p. If this were untrue, we would be able to say that when Y doesn’t want to do 
p, X is powerful to make him do it. We should then say that if Y wants to do p, 
then X’s capacity to get him to do p suddenly evaporates even if there is no 
change in X’s capacities, or that Y’s wanting somehow changes X’s capacities. 
This, it seems to me, is nonsense. I cannot imagine how Y’s wanting could affect 
X’s capacities, and if X’s capacities remain unchanged, it matters not whether Y
wants to do p or not, what X can do he can do. What that thing is, is to get Y to 
perform p, not to get Y to do something – any thing – that is against his will: it 
matters not whether p is or is not against Y’s will, if X can do it he has the 
capacity to do it, it makes no sense to suggest that he is powerless to do it 
regardless of Y’s intention. As a practical example, we might say that a judge or 
senior police officer could cause a policeman to police by the rules even if that 
officer wants to police by the rules, because they could even in the circumstance 
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that he doesn’t want to: they can in either circumstance, and what they can do, is 
get the police officer to abide by the rules, not get him to do something –
anything – that is against his will. This is true, because, as we have seen above, 
it is ‘could’ that is ‘constitutionally iffy’, not ‘can’. The senior police officer ‘can’, 
because he ‘could if’, and when the police officer doesn’t want to police by the 
rules, the ‘if’ of the ‘could if’ is satisfied.
The locution ‘power over’ is frequently taken to mean something 
normatively negative. For example, white supremacists represented the phrase 
‘Black Power’ to mean ‘black power over white people’ when the phrase actually 
meant black empowerment. They used the association of power with ‘power over’ 
to misrepresent the legitimate aims of black people. To speak of power merely as 
‘power over’ is to reduce power solely to those instances when one person’s 
objective is to subjugate another to his own ends or to get someone to do 
something they do not want to do. This, of course, as is evident in Foucault, 
ignores any positive power such as the power to mobilize food aid in Ethiopia for 
example.
One reason that ‘power over’ has been championed by some is that it is 
claimed (Oppenheim 1981) that ‘power to’ fails to represent the relational nature 
of power between people: the truth that power exists in relational quantities 
between people. A has greater power than B: A is more powerful than B. Lukes, 
for example avers that ‘power to’ “indicates a ‘capacity’, a ‘facility’, an ‘ability’ not 
a relationship. Accordingly, the conflictual aspect of power – the fact that it is
exercised over people – disappears altogether from view” (1974:31). Once again, 
this is mistaken. What Lukes wants to say is that power is frequently exercised in 
ways that are normatively negative – people’s capacity to govern their lives is 
restricted, their chances for personal development constrained. He also wants to 
say that powerful people have more power than powerless people. Following from 
these two statements, he sees powerful people as bad people. However, to say 
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that someone has ‘power to’ in no way hides what they can do, even if what they 
can do is in conflict with the desires of others and that what they do is bad. This 
normative question is an ethical one, whether or not what this person does is bad 
has nothing to do with whether or not this person can do what he does – if he 
does it, he can do it. That a government can tax the poor inequitably can be 
legitimately expressed by saying the government has ‘power to’ tax poor people 
more harshly than the rich. We may also express this relationally by saying that 
the government has more ‘power to’ keep your money than you do. Whether this 
state of affairs is the result of the power of bad people, whether it is normatively 
negative is a question for us when we think ethically, it is not of concern when 
examining the essential qualities of power. We do not need to use the 
normatively laden ‘power over’ to express exactly what we mean about our 
inequitable tax system and the role of powerful people in its application.
When we use the word power, we always use it in conjunction with 
something else. If we say ‘Algernon has power’ the statement is meaningless 
unless we say what it is Algernon has power to do, and the locution ‘power over’ 
frequently is seen as legitimate in these terms: Algernon has power over Ichabod. 
However, it is always the case that we can express any kind of ‘power over’ in 
terms of ‘power to’. Morriss says that “[t]he only way that the English language 
allows ‘power’ to be followed by a word for a person is by talking of power being
over the person. Ergo, it seems, all social power becomes power over someone”
(2002:32). However, even though what Morriss says is true of the language in 
the specific terms of this rule, it is not the case that this is the only way that the 
relationship between power and people can be expressed. We can say Algernon
has power over his wife, and this is meaningless unless we say what Algernon can 
do: Algernon has power over his wife’s choice of car. Note that this has changed 
from power over his wife – which on its own is meaningless, to power over her 
choices, which is not the same thing as power over her per se. We can express 
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this perfectly legitimately by saying that Algernon has power to affect his wife’s 
choice of car, or power to direct his wife’s choice of car. We do not have to use 
‘power over’ at all, indeed, ‘power over’ in itself is meaningless unless we say 
what it is ‘power to’ do, and if we are explicit and say what it is power to do, we 
do not need the locution power over at all. 
Power and intention.
A further dispute concerning the nature of power becomes visible when we 
take Bertrand Russell’s definition of power: power is “the production of intended 
effects” (Russell 1938:25). This theme is adopted by Wrong in 1979 “power is the 
capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others” 
(Wrong 1995:2). The key word here is not “effects”, we have discussed the 
reliance of a conception of power on “effects” above. The word in contention here 
is “intended”. The claim of these two definitions is that one is only powerful when 
one intends to do things: that one only has power with respect to something
when one intends to do that thing and in consequence, one cannot be taken to be 
powerful with respect to something if the doing of it was unintentional. Once 
again, the claim that power equates merely to can suggests that this conception 
is wrong. 
Wrong (1995 [1979]) is of the opinion that power can only refer to 
intentional acts. He opens his discussion of this point by saying that all social 
interaction consists in various controls, but that not all of those controls are 
intentional. Many controls are internalized by socializing processes such as 
parenting for example, and, in these circumstances, says Wrong, the controls act 
without the intention of the others in the situation. Here, he says, it makes no 
sense to suggest that power is evident in effecting those controls. However, this 
is mistaken. Because all social controls are situated as well as being relatively 
durable and dispositional, it is the actors in any situation that bring those controls 
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to bare on the controlled, by whatever means (and it is to the study of those 
means – vehicles and bases – that criminologists and sociologists should direct 
their studies). This is true even if the control that is at work has been 
internalized. The actors in a situation are taken to have the capacity, more or 
less, to bring another to behave to the norms and typifications of that situation as 
defined by the participants in the situation (see in particular Blumer 1969; Hewitt 
1997; Goffman 1952, 1961, 1968,1974, & passim; Collins 2004; inter alia). 
Actors do not do this intentionally, but they do it. It would make no sense 
whatsoever to suggest that those in the situation who do this were powerless to 
do it.
What Wrong goes on to say is that there are many social outcomes that 
are unintended by the actors that may have brought them about. He also tells us 
that people are not held responsible for unintended consequences if they could 
have not foreseen these consequences. Moreover, we know that sociologists from 
Merton (1968[1949]) to Giddens (1976, 1979, 1986 & passim) and beyond have 
encouraged us to make a study of the unintended consequences of intended 
action. However, it is a long way from saying that people are or are not morally 
responsible for their actions to saying that they are powerful or powerless7. Whilst 
the two often go together, they do not equate to one another, and I will explore 
this issue a little more later. (Indeed Wrong himself points out that there are grey 
areas.)
The claim that I support here, that power is not necessarily to be equated
to intentional acts is sometimes undermined by its own supporters. Oppenheim 
(1981), for example points to the unintended outcomes involved in certain 
reporting of electoral politics. He brings our attention to the pollsters who 
predicted Truman would lose the presidential election in 1948 and who, in so 
                                               
7 Indeed, it is conventionally taken to be the case that it is powerfulness that is indicative of moral 
responsibility, not moral responsibility that is indicative of power.
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doing spurred previously apathetic voters to turn out and vote for him. 
Oppenheim claims that this is a case of unintentional power to effect Truman’s 
election. This however, is a case of influence (indeed, Oppenheim uses the word 
himself) and we have seen above that influence and power are not identical to 
one another. What the case really shows is that the pollsters have the power to 
affect the actions of the voters, not effect the election of Truman.
There are, however, two kinds of defence of the non-identity of power and 
intention that I take to be of great significance. The first has to do with 
unintentional bodily functions. Danto (1973) points out that some of our bodily 
functions occur without our intention. We might consider the involuntary, 
unintended consequence of our appearance or behaviour (or other intangible) to 
the opposite sex. We clearly have power in that regard: we attract them (if we 
are lucky); we have the power to do that. It is nonsense to suggest that we are 
powerless to attract the opposite sex if and when we do it, whether we do it 
intentionally or not. What is of importance here is that this capacity of humans to 
attract the opposite sex unintentionally is socially of  great consequence, and just 
because it is ubiquitous or even universal, this does not mean that it is equally 
distributed. Indeed the means of its distribution have significant ramifications, 
especially when it appears that certain social patterns and inequalities are 
reproduced in our (possibly, partially unintended) choice of mate. This 
reproduction of patterns of choice of mate has considerable influence on the 
reproduction of inequalities of the distribution of capacities in our society. The 
unintended powers imbued by the capacity to send a young man to an expensive 
school, such as a bearing and manner, of confidence and suavity, perhaps, may 
have important effects in the reproduction of the capacity to continue to send 
offspring of that family to expensive educational establishments and then to the 
best universities. These are capacities – powers – that are very much of interest 
to both sociologists and criminologists and they can be utterly unintended.
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The second important claim supporting the assertion that power is not 
identical to intention alerts us to that assertion’s consequent denial of the 
importance of materialities, or inanimate objects that plainly do not possess the 
capacity for intention. Morriss suggests that to introduce inanimate objects into 
the equation is to confuse social power with natural power. Whilst he may be 
right that it introduces natural power into consideration of powers he is wrong to 
say that this is confusion. What this introduction does is to point out that the 
assumption of a natural distinction between natural power and social power is 
problematic. This is an area that has received much attention from scholars 
studying hybridity such as Marilyn Strathern (1991 inter alia), Donna Haraway 
(1991), and writers such as Callon (1986 a & b, 1991), Law (1991), and Latour 
(1986, 1988) among others, in the school known as Actor Network Theory. 
Callon, for example, in his account of Electricité de France’s attempts to promote 
an electric car, (1986b) shows how the company assembles individual, social, 
expressive, and inanimate-material capacities to bring about the emergence of 
new capacities in its attempts to get the car to the market-place. 
The observation that the boundary between natural power and social 
power is indistinct or non-existent is nowhere more apparent than it is in 
criminology. The carrying of a gun or a knife causes a significant quantity of new 
capacities to emerge that would not be present in the absence of a weapon, and 
these capacities are of the utmost interest to criminologists. No one has the 
power to stab another person if he is not in possession of a knife: a man only has 
the power to shoot someone if he is in possession of a gun. The material object 
has a considerable role in the emergent capacities of any social situation but 
particularly where weapons are concerned, and weapons can effect injuries and 
death even when the carrier has no intention to do so, as, for example in the case 
of boys carrying knives purely for show and status. The criminal or moral 
responsibility in such cases is a separate matter for moral philosophers: it is not 
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an issue in identifying the nature of power. Moreover, to suggest that the boy-
knife assemblage is powerless to do harm unless harm is intended is clearly 
nonsense.
It is appropriate when considering this issue that the nature of the origin 
of such capacities should be explored. Where the boy-knife assemblage is 
concerned, neither the boy nor the knife alone has the capacity to stab someone. 
Indeed even though we might think that the knife has the capacity to harm in 
other ways on its own – placing your hand on it accidentally when it is on the 
chopping board for example – it is the case that this contact with the knife on the 
board constitutes an assemblage of the knife and the harmed from which the 
capacity to harm emerges: the knife cannot harm anyone if it is not in an 
assemblage with someone whom it can harm. It is only when the two are in 
agencement with a person that the new capacity to stab emerges. Novel 
capacities emerge from the processes of assemblage. These processes are 
situated and all situations are new. Nonetheless, all assemblages vary in 
durability as well as scale (though the two are often correlated), and this makes 
these capacities more or less dispositional. We should note however, in our 
discussion of intent, that it is the boy’s capacity to mobilize the knife that brings 
about the assemblage’s capacity to stab, not his will or intention, since he clearly 
can stab someone by accident, and if he can do it, in the circumstance where he 
has no intention, then it is nonsense to say that he is powerless to do it even if he 
has no intention so to do. Hence, it is not legitimate to equate power and 
intention.
Power and responsibility.
Above, it was noted that Wrong made use of a supposed relationship 
between power and moral responsibility in support of his claim that power must 
be intentional. I suggested that to use this supposed relationship as a support for 
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology Crewe
2010, Vol. 2 (2) 22-68 Power
59
this claim was mistaken because the relationship is not as straightforward as is 
conventionally assumed. Whilst it is conventional to assume that power and moral 
responsibility equate to one another, this assumption is problematic. This is so 
because moral responsibility is primarily related to freedom and not to power; it 
is the freedom of an actor that is in question not necessarily their powerfulness or 
powerlessness with respect to some act that determines their moral 
responsibility. That is, moral responsibility relates to what is termed the Principle 
of Alternative Possibilities (PAP): we are held to be morally responsible for actions 
when we could have done otherwise than we did. The problem with equating 
power to moral responsibility is illustrated by what are known as Frankfurt-type 
examples.
In a paper of 1969 Frankfurt presents a conundrum concerning moral 
responsibility and freedom8. The premise in such cases is that an actor acts with 
freedom and intention to do something while it is simultaneously true that he is 
powerless to do otherwise (PAP). We are encouraged to imagine an all powerful 
ruler who can prevent any and all actions that he chooses and permit, similarly, 
only those that are his will. This power is exercised over a man such that he can 
only do exactly x. However, the man over whom the power is exercised wishes to 
do x, and he does x. We are aware from our discussion thus far of power that the 
man cannot be described as being powerless to do what he does, although we 
know (and he doesn’t) that he is powerless to do anything other than what he 
does. So, the man is powerful with respect to x, the question arises whether he 
                                               
8 This idea has its origins in Locke (1975 [1690]), where Locke envisages a man being carried whilst 
asleep to a room where there is a person whom he wishes to see. When he awakes, he is glad to stay 
in the company of the person and does so willingly, even though, unbeknownst to him, the captor 
who brought him there asleep has locked the room against his escape. The question arises whether 
the man’s is free and morally responsible for his staying in the room.
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has moral responsibility with respect to x (whatever x is, although we may 
choose to assume that it is a normatively negative act). These cases are usually 
advanced as evidence of an actor’s moral responsibility in the face of the absence 
of alternate possibilities and this is so because he wills freely what he does. 
However an argument has been advanced relatively recently by Widerker (1991) 
Copp (1997) and Haji (1993) that supports the opposing view, that is, that the 
absence of possibilities even in Frankfurt style cases removes moral 
responsibility, and would thus sever the automatic link between moral 
responsibility and power. 
Let us suppose that someone does something that we would recognize and 
agree was bad. Let’s suggest lying about the condition of a dangerous car when 
selling it. If this act is, as we agree, wrong, then it is the case that the seller 
should not (ought not to) have done it: he should have done something else 
instead – and this could mean simply not doing what he did. But “ought implies 
can”, that is, whenever we use the word ought (or should) it can only be used 
legitimately if the actor can do what we say they ought to do: it is relatively 
straight forward to say that we would be wrong to assert that someone ought to 
do something when it is not possible for them to do it. This is a maxim that is 
generally accepted to be true from Kant (1993). In this circumstance that would 
mean that the seller of the car must be capable of not selling it or not lying about 
it if we are to be able to say legitimately that he ought not to lie about the car. 
However, if this were a Frankfurt-style case our all-powerful being would prevent 
him from doing anything other than exactly what he does and thus he would be 
powerless to do otherwise. In this circumstance therefore the “ought implies can” 
maxim and the car salesman’s consequent powerlessness to do otherwise absolve 
him of moral responsibility even though he clearly is willing to lie to sell the 
dodgy car and even though he does lie to sell the car and therefore is powerful to 
do it. 
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Whilst this is only the most simple look at the problems associated with 
Frankfurt-style cases (and indeed many writers conclude that Frankfurt-style 
cases provide reason to abandon the Principle of Alternative Possibilities test for 
moral responsibility), and even though Frankfurt style ‘all powerful beings’ don’t 
exist in the real world, it opens up to us the possibility that the assumed 
correlation between powerfulness and moral responsibility is far from 
straightforward. 
Conclusion
Each of these engagements with disputes concerning the nature of power 
leaves us with the strong suggestion that power equates merely to ‘can’ or 
‘capacity’, indeed, whilst this conception limits what we can say about power, it 
resolves a range of disputes that have arisen when writers have tried to say 
more. What one is powerful with respect to is a very different question to what 
power amounts to: what it is. What mechanisms distribute power is another 
question again. These are the empirical questions of criminological and 
sociological enquiry. If our capacities are what we can do, then everything that 
we do can be expressed in terms of our capacity to do that thing. Thus, all 
elements of the processes of societies are capacities of someone or other, or 
something or other. In this circumstance any analysis of the structure of societies 
becomes an analysis of the distribution of capacities. That is, power is not a 
property of powerful people as seems to be the contention of many writers, 
where the property ‘powerfulness’ gives rise to the function ‘exercising certain 
kinds of power in certain kinds of roles’, but power merely relates to their 
capacities, and therefore any analysis of social ‘structures’ requires an analysis of 
the distribution of and the mechanisms of the distribution of capacities: 
institutions are what they can do, not merely what they do do. This means that 
they are greater than the apparent sum of their parts: indeed they are greater 
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than the real sum of their parts because capacities emerge (in the strong sense) 
from their assemblage – from their territorialisation or deterritorialization – their
processes of becoming-molar or becoming-molecular. This undermines the 
functional whole in two ways. It shows that the elements of a structure need not 
equate to their function because they can be greater than what they do do – they 
must be aligned with their capacities not their properties. Moreover, inasmuch as 
they are greater than the sum of their parts, they, as elements of other 
structures, assemble to create entities that are greater than the sum of their 
parts too – this is the nature of large institutions and, thus, of the vast repertoire 
and magnitude of capacities (power) that emerge from them. It is necessary 
therefore, if we are to generate a theory of how crime, deviance, transgression 
and law emerge from complex social structures, we must adopt a view of those 
structures that is consistent with relations between them being relations of 
exteriority: that is, relations of their capacities, not of their properties, functions,
or roles. We must turn to a theory where certain capacities emerge from the 
territorializing processes of assemblages – their processes of becoming-molar, 
and where schizophrenic capacities of freedom emerge from the deterritorializing 
processes of disassembling – the processes of becoming-molecular.
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